I joined the Department of Economics at Middlesex University in September 2019. Before, I worked as Lecturer at the University of Essex and as Senior Research Fellow at the Inter-American Development Bank.
Spanish, English, Portuguese, a little bit of Italian.
Microeconomics: Advanced and Intermediate. I also teach Economic Policy. I am Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (PR181753).
Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution
Social Choice & Welfare (2022)
with Julian Costas-Fernandez-UCL;
We study the use of social expenditures and regulation for redistribution. When regulated goods are essential in the consumption bundle of the poor, a high poverty rate creates incentives to increase redistribution through regulation. By contrast, inequality directs redistribution towards social expenditures. We propose a theoretical model that captures the trade-off between these two redistributive policies and test the model implications with a novel municipality dataset on income and local government policies. Theory predicts and empirical evidence supports that failing to account for poverty biases the effect of inequality on redistribution. Our evidence also reflects the positive connection between poverty and the use of regulation for redistribution.
When do interest groups and constituents lobby legislators in strongly presidential systems?, Under Review (2022)
with Andres Dockendorff - UChile
In strongly presidential democracies, when do interest groups and constituents target legislators to approach or lobby? This article explores three hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds most exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues of their concern, but only on policy areas outside the executive’s exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). Third, constituents from remote districts are more likely to contact their representatives to present demands, grievances, and casework (Centre–Periphery Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6,479 lobbying audiences and over 2,300 bills.
Is it campaign contribution or corruption? Political money in regulation with fully informed voters, Under Review (2022)
with Christos Mavridis-MDX
Persistence in legislative bargaining (ongoing)
This study presents a novel dynamic argument to explain why we see different legislative decisions as responses to the same state of the world. This result departs from the literature on legislative bargaining since it provides conditions under which the policy gridlock equilibrium does not take place.
The effect of supports to firms on the labour market incentives (ongoing)
with Tulio Cravo, and Paulo Jacinto
This work aims to assess the impact that public programs supporting hiring firms have on the labour market incentives using observational data on formal employees in Brazil.
Impact Evaluation of SME programs in Brazil (2014)
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Saleema Vellani
We conducted an impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the main programs supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Brazil. Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, the evaluation examines (i) how various SME interventions and various combinations of these interventions affect variables of interest such as employment, real wages, exports, and patent and trademark registration; and (ii) to what extent the duration and sequencing of SME interventions influence the impact on these variables of interest.
Economic performance and industrial clusters in Brazil (2013)
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Caio Piza
Industrial clusters, which are commonly targeted to receive financial support allocated to locally based development projects, are seen as an effective industrial policy tool for improving productivity and generating employment. Nevertheless, identifying clusters and assessing their economic performance is a challenge for policymakers. This paper aims to address this challenge by identifying the location of clusters based on neighbour relationships and specialisation in Brazil and providing some insights on their effects on employment generation. The paper uses both Location Quotient and Local Indicator of Spatial Association to identify potential clusters in 27 industrial sectors in 5564 Brazilian municipalities. In addition, it uses annual municipal panel data for 2006-2009 to assess whether the presence of potential clusters is correlated with employment generation. The results show that clusters located in municipalities whose neighbours have similar industrial structures perform better than those that present industry specialisation only.
Country Program Evaluation: Ecuador 2007-2011 (2012)
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, Caio Piza, and Alejandra Palma
Evaluation of the Opportunity for the Majority Initiative (2012)
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Caio Piza
Lodato, Simon and Dockendorff, Andrés (2023) When do interest groups lobby legislators in strong presidential systems? Legislative Studies Quarterly . ISSN 1939-9162 (Published online first)
Costas-Fernandez, Julián and Lodato, Simon (2022) Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution. Social Choice and Welfare , 59 (4). pp. 925-967. ISSN 0176-1714
Lodato, Simon (2018) The welfare effects of political money in regulation. In: Essex Internal Seminar, Feb 2018, University of Essex, UK.
Pires, Jose Claudio and Lodato, Simon and Cravo, Tulio and Vellani, Saleema (2014) A comparative analysis of IDB approaches supporting SMEs: assessing results in the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Project Report. Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, D.C., United States.
Cravo, Tulio and Lodato, Simon and Pires, Claudio and Piza, Caio (2013) Industrial clusters and economic performance in Brazil. Working Paper. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., United States.
