I joined the Department of Economics at Middlesex University in September 2019. Before, I worked as Lecturer at the University of Essex and as Senior Research Fellow at the Inter-American Development Bank.
Spanish, English, Portuguese, a little bit of Italian.
Microeconomics: Advanced and Intermediate. In particular, I enjoy teaching game theory. Among others, I also teach the following topics: Development Economics and Data Analysis. I am Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (PR181753).
Developing countries subsidise the tariffs of public utilities such as electricity or transportation with high costs in terms of the quality and sustainability of the utility provisions. Even when governments repeatedly claim that the main goal of these subsidies is to improve the well-being of the poor, most literature has explained the use of these tools is driven by income inequality rather than the poverty rate. In contrast, I study the effect of the size of the poor on the choice of the mix of regulation and other traditional forms of redistributive policy. I begin by showing that the poor are better characterised by their consumption bundle than their income. Consequently, when the public utilities are essential for the poor, a higher poverty rate leads to a larger amount of subsidies to utilities and a smaller size of income redistribution.
Corporations devote costly efforts to gain access to candidates before elections. These pre-electoral attempts take many forms and commonly result in a welfare loss. Then, I explore the consequences of the access of a monopolistic rm to a candidate on the regulatory policy. I show that when the rm transfers a private interest to a popular candidate, regulation results in gains for both the rm and the candidate; and a welfare loss for the voters. Instead, this welfare loss does not take place when the firm uses campaign contributions as signals to communicate private information. From this perspective, there are benefits in permitting interest groups to fund political campaigns.
Lobbying disclosure laws and strategic learning in legislatures (ongoing)
with Andres Dockendorff (University of Chile)
Persistence in legislative bargaining (ongoing)
This study presents a novel dynamic argument to explain why we see different legislative decisions as responses to the same state of the world. This result departs from the literature on legislative bargaining since it provides conditions under which the policy gridlock equilibrium does not take place.
with Julian Costas (UCL)
We use data from the Survey of Household Expenditure from Argentina and Brazil to test the effect that the number of poor people have on the mix of redistributive policies, welfare transfers and subsidies to electricity and transportation. We identify the poor by estimating a utility function that defines the relevance that transportation and electricity have on the budget of the households.
The effect of supports to firms on the labour market incentives (ongoing)
with Tulio Cravo, and Paulo Jacinto
This work aims to assess the impact that public programs supporting hiring firms have on the labour market incentives using observational data on formal employees in Brazil.
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Saleema Vellani
We conducted an impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the main programs supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Brazil. Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, the evaluation examines (i) how various SME interventions and various combinations of these interventions affect variables of interest such as employment, real wages, exports, and patent and trademark registration; and (ii) to what extent the duration and sequencing of SME interventions influence the impact on these variables of interest.
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Caio Piza
Industrial clusters, which are commonly targeted to receive financial support allocated to locally based development projects, are seen as an effective industrial policy tool for improving productivity and generating employment. Nevertheless, identifying clusters and assessing their economic performance is a challenge for policymakers. This paper aims to address this challenge by identifying the location of clusters based on neighbour relationships and specialisation in Brazil and providing some insights on their effects on employment generation. The paper uses both Location Quotient and Local Indicator of Spatial Association to identify potential clusters in 27 industrial sectors in 5564 Brazilian municipalities. In addition, it uses annual municipal panel data for 2006-2009 to assess whether the presence of potential clusters is correlated with employment generation. The results show that clusters located in municipalities whose neighbours have similar industrial structures perform better than those that present industry specialisation only.
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, Caio Piza, and Alejandra Palma
with Tulio Cravo, Jose Pires, and Caio Piza
Lodato, Simon (2018) The welfare effects of political money in regulation. In: Essex Internal Seminar, Feb 2018, University of Essex, UK.
Pires, Jose Claudio and Lodato, Simon and Cravo, Tulio and Vellani, Saleema (2014) A comparative analysis of IDB approaches supporting SMEs: assessing results in the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Project Report. Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, D.C., United States.
Cravo, Tulio and Lodato, Simon and Pires, Claudio and Piza, Caio (2013) Industrial clusters and economic performance in Brazil. Working Paper. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., United States.
Lodato, Simon Regulation to redistribute well-being: political incentives in poor countries. In: Essex Seminar, Aug 2018, University of Essex, UK.