Why fears over Arctic ‘Cold War’ are hot air

26 February 2026

A view of the arctic ocean with rocks in the foreground, a blue sky and ice floes in the sea

A turning point in international relations from President Trump

President Trump’s stated desire to annex Greenland is undoubtedly significant for the future of NATO and transatlantic relations. Even if the plan never materialises, an American threat to conquer land from a long-term and loyal ally must undermine trust and mark a turning point in the post-World War Two international order. However, this shocking development does not mean a new ‘Cold War’ in the far north is imminent.

For several decades I have been researching and writing about the politics of the Arctic and the competition for oil and gas. My research has also focussed on environmental cooperation, indigenous rights and long-term security in the region.

The Arctic has long been seen as a likely arena for great power conflict over its bountiful resources and shipping lanes, which are made more accessible by retreating ice caps.

In this current escalation Trump has stated the need to counter Chinese and Russian threats to the world’s largest island as the justification for his annexation plan. Observers believe the opportunity for US businesses to access rare earth minerals on and around Greenland is the more likely real motivation. However, since the US has long had the right to station their troops in Greenland and the territory is open to business from foreign mining corporations, neither of these explanations stands up to scrutiny.

Geopolitics of symbolism

As with most foreign policy statements in the Arctic, what we are seeing is more the geopolitics of symbolism than security. As illustrated in the White House meme published in the wake of the annexation statement (showing Canada and Greenland on a map as the 51st and 52nd states), Trump likes the idea of flying the Stars and Stripes over new territory and being the President of the biggest ever USA. This is a dramatic shift in US Arctic policy, since their approach to the region since the end of the Cold War has largely been one of indifference.

This is in comparison to the other Arctic Ocean states - Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark- who have been busy increasing their territorial and maritime rights.

These rival arctic claims of the Russians, Canadians, Norwegians and Danes, though, have never shown any likelihood of escalating into armed conflict, even after the sharp deterioration in relations that has occurred since full scale war in Ukraine was launched by Russia in 2022, which led to their exclusion from the Arctic Council. Over the past two decades here has been some tough talk over the Arctic, particularly from the Russians and Canadians. In private, though, diplomats and politicians from Ottawa and Moscow have admitted that statements of sovereign control and warnings to the other side are more for show than real threats. Canadians and Russians identify as being part of Arctic nations and the flag waving military manoeuvres carried out by their governments are largely playing to this domestic gallery.

The Ukrainian context

The Ukraine War, certainly, has given a ‘real’ edge to such military manoeuvres, that were previously no more than theatre, but there is still not much to fight over in the Arctic.  Russia already has a firm foothold in the Arctic and would stand to lose more in terms of disrupting business than it could gain by stoking conflict over disputes such as the fishing waters around Svalbard (islands under Norwegian sovereign control but constrained by an international treaty) or the Lomonosov Ridge (a large area under the Arctic Ocean that crosses the North Pole disputed by Russia, Canada and Denmark).

The Ukraine War fallout pushing Russia and China closer together is an obvious Western anxiety, but this should not have any great bearing on Arctic diplomacy. Chinese-Russian cooperation in the Arctic has increased with Beijing keen to reap the rewards of opening the Northern Sea route above Russia. However, most Chinese interest in the Arctic thus far has been building economic ties with Greenland and Iceland and they must tread carefully here since any role they have in the lands of the region is by invitation. At the same time, talk of a ‘new oil rush’ from two decades ago now seems like hyperbole. A scramble for Arctic resources has never really materialised with the prospect of oil, gas and minerals in such remote locations still too difficult and expensive to be viable.

Arctic realities

The Arctic may be warming rapidly but it is still thinly populated, dark for long periods of the year and difficult to navigate since melting caps produce more icebergs as well as sea lanes.

The Russian and Canadian media and public have always expected their governments to be forceful in Arctic affairs and the Danes also have now had to rally to the cause of maintaining Arctic sovereignty, in the face of not Russian but American advances on their imperial relic.

In contrast, US public opinion is largely indifferent to the Arctic and there is no need for Washington to play to a domestic audience. With Trump, though of course, the audience is himself...

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